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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-896
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THUNDER BASIN COAL COMPANY, PETITIONER
v. ROBERT B. REICH, SECRETARY
OF LABOR, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the tenth circuit
[January 19, 1994]

 Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
 In this case, we address the question whether the
statutory-review scheme in the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1292, as
amended, 30 U. S. C. 801 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp.
IV) (Mine Act or Act), prevents a district court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforce-
ment challenge to the Act.  We hold that it does.
                      I
 Congress adopted the Mine Act -to protect the health
and safety of the nation's coal or other miners.-  30
U. S. C. 801(g).  The Act requires the Secretary of
Labor or his representative to conduct periodic, unan-
nounced health and safety inspections of the Nation's
mines.  Section 813(f) provides:
-A representative of the operator and a representa-
tive authorized by his miners shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his
authorized representative during the physical
inspection of any coal or other mine . . . for the
purpose of aiding such inspection and to participate
in pre- or post-inspection conferences held at the
mine.-
 Regulations promulgated under this section define a
miners' representative as -[a]ny person or organization
which represents two or more miners at a coal or other
mine for purposes of the Act.-  30 CFR 40.1(b)(1)
(1993).
 In addition to exercising these -walk-around- inspec-
tion rights under 813(f), persons designated as repre-
sentatives of the miners may obtain certain health and
safety information and promote health and safety
enforcement.  Once the mine employees designate one
or more persons as their representatives, the employer
must post at the mine information regarding these
designees.  30 CFR 40.4.
 The Secretary has broad authority to compel immedi-
ate compliance with Mine Act provisions through the use
of mandatory civil penalties, discretionary daily civil
penalties, and other sanctions.  Challenges to enforce-
ment are reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, 30 U. S. C. 815 and 823,
which is independent of the Department of Labor, and
by the appropriate United States Court of Appeals,
816.
                     II
 Petitioner Thunder Basin Coal Company operates a
surface coal mine in Wyoming with approximately 500
nonunion employees.  In 1990, petitioner's employees
selected two employees of the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA), who were not employees of the mine,
to serve as their miners' representatives pursuant to
813(f).  Petitioner did not post the information regard-
ing the miners' representatives as required by 30 CFR
40.4, but complained to the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) that the designation compro-
mised its rights under the National Labor Relations Act.
App. 31.  The MSHA District Manager responded with
a letter instructing petitioner to post the miners'
representative designations.  Id., at 49.
 Rather than post the designations and before receiving
the MSHA letter, petitioner filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming for
pre-enforcement injunctive relief.  Id., at 6.  Petitioner
contended that the designation of non-employee UMWA
-representatives- violated the principles of collective-
bargaining representation under the NLRA as well as
the company's NLRA rights to exclude union organizers
from its property.  Id., at 9-10.  Petitioner argued then,
as it does here, that deprivation of these rights would
harm the company irreparably by -giv[ing] the union
organizing advantages in terms of access, personal
contact and knowledge that would not be available
under the labor laws, as well as enhanced credibility
flowing from the appearance of government imprimatur.-
Reply Brief for Petitioner 14.
 Petitioner additionally alleged that requiring it to
challenge the MSHA's interpretation of 30 U. S. C.
813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 through the statutory-review
process would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, since the company would be forced to
choose between violating the Act and incurring possible
escalating daily penalties, or, on the other hand,
complying with the designations and suffering irrepara-
ble harm.  The District Court enjoined respondents from
enforcing 30 CFR pt. 40, finding that petitioner had
raised serious questions going to the merits and that it
might face irreparable harm.
 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforcement
and administrative-review scheme precluded district
court jurisdiction over petitioner's claims.  969 F. 2d 970
(1992).  The court stated:
-The gravamen of Thunder Basin's case is a dispute
over an anticipated citation and penalty . . . .
Operators may not avoid the Mine Act's administra-
tive review process simply by filing in a district
court before actually receiving an anticipated cita-
tion, order, or assessment of penalty.-  Id., at 975.
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, -would permit
preemptive strikes that could seriously hamper effective
enforcement of the Act, disrupting the review scheme
Congress intended.-  Ibid.  The court also concluded that
the Mine Act's review procedures adequately protected
petitioner's due process rights.  Ibid.
 We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question,
507 U. S. ___ (1993), to resolve a claimed conflict with
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  See Southern Ohio
Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F. 2d 693 (1985), amended,
781 F. 2d 57 (1986).
                     III
 In cases involving delayed judicial review of final
agency actions, we shall find that Congress has allocated
initial review to an administrative body where such
intent is -fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.-
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340,
351 (1984), quoting Data Processing Service v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970).  Whether a statute is intended
to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the
statute's language, structure, and purpose, its legislative
history, Block, 467 U.S., at 345, and whether the claims
can be afforded meaningful review.  See, e.g., Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial,
Inc., 502 U.S. ___ (1991); Whitney Bank v. New Orleans
Bank, 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
                      A
 Applying this analysis to the review scheme before us,
we conclude that the Mine Act precludes district court
jurisdiction over the pre-enforcement challenge made
here.  The Act establishes a detailed structure for
reviewing violations of -any mandatory health or safety
standard, rule, order, or regulation promulgated- under
the Act.  814(a).  A mine operator has 30 days to
challenge before the Commission any citation issued
under the Act, after which time an uncontested order
becomes -final- and -not subject to review by any court
or agency.-  815(a) and (d).  Timely challenges are
heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ),
823(d)(1), with possible Commission review.  Only the
Commission has authority actually to impose civil
penalties proposed by the Secretary, 820(i), and the
Commission reviews all proposed civil penalties de novo
according to six criteria.  The Commission may grant
temporary relief pending review of most orders,
815(b)(2), and must expedite review where necessary,
815(d).
 Mine operators may challenge adverse Commission
decisions in the appropriate Court of Appeals, 816(a)(1),
whose jurisdiction -shall be exclusive and its judgment
and decree shall be final- except for possible Supreme
Court review.  Ibid.  The Court of Appeals must uphold
findings of the Commission that are substantially
supported by the record, ibid., but may grant temporary
relief pending final determination of most proceedings,
816(2).
 Although the statute establishes that the Commission
and the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to agency enforcement proceedings, the Act is
facially silent with respect to pre-enforcement claims.
The structure of the Mine Act, however, demonstrates
that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as
the present one.  The Act's comprehensive review
process does not distinguish between pre- and post-
enforcement challenges, but applies to all violations of
the Act and its regulations.  814(a).  Contrary to
petitioner's suggestion, Reply Brief for Petitioner 3,
actions before the Commission are initiated not by the
Secretary but by a mine operator who claims to be
aggrieved.  See 815(a).  The Act expressly authorizes
district court jurisdiction in only two provisions,
818(a) and 820(j), which respectively empower the
Secretary to enjoin habitual violations of health and
safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penal-
ties.  Mine operators enjoy no corresponding right but
are to complain to the Commission and then to the
Court of Appeals.
                      B
 The legislative history of the Mine Act confirms this
interpretation.  At the time of the Act's passage, at least
one worker was killed and 66 miners were disabled
every working day in the Nation's mines.  See S. Rep.
No. 95-181, p. 4 (1977), Legislative History of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Committee
Print prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Senate Committee on Human Resources) Ser. No. 95-2,
p. 592 (1977) (Leg. Hist.).  Frequent and tragic mining
disasters testified to the ineffectiveness of then-existing
enforcement measures.  Under existing legislation,
civil penalties were not always mandatory and were too
low to compel compliance, and enforcement was hobbled
by a cumbersome review process.
 Congress expressed particular concern that under the
previous Coal Act mine operators could contest civil-
penalty assessments de novo in federal district court
once the administrative review process was complete,
thereby -seriously hamper[ing] the collection of civil
penalties.-  Concluding that -rapid abatement of
violations is essential for the protection of miners,- Leg.
Hist. 618, Congress accordingly made improved penalties
and enforcement measures a primary goal of the Act.
 The 1977 Mine Act thus strengthened and streamlined
health and safety enforcement requirements.  The Act
authorized the Secretary to compel payment of penalties
and to enjoin habitual health and safety violators in
federal district court.  See Leg. Hist. 627; 30 U. S. C.
820(j) and 818(a).  Assessment of civil penalties was
made mandatory for all mines, and Congress expressly
eliminated the power of a mine operator to challenge a
final penalty assessment de novo in district court.  Cf.
Whitney Bank, 379 U. S., at 420 (1965) (that -Congress
rejected a proposal for a de novo review in the district
courts of Board decisions- supports a finding of district
court preclusion).  We consider the legislative history
and these amendments to be persuasive evidence that
Congress intended to direct ordinary challenges under
the Mine Act to a single review process.
 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967),
is not to the contrary.  In that case, this Court held
that statutory review of certain provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended
by the Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780, 21
U. S. C. 301 et seq., did not preclude district court
jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to regula-
tions promulgated under separate provisions of that Act.
In so holding, the Court found that the presence of a
statutory saving clause, see 387 U. S., at 144, and the
statute's legislative history demonstrated -rather conclu-
sively that the specific review provisions were designed
to give an additional remedy and not to cut down more
traditional channels of review.-  Id., at 142.  It con-
cluded that Congress' primary concern in adopting the
administrative-review procedures was to supplement
review of specific agency determinations over which
traditional forms of review might be inadequate.  Id., at
142-144.  Contrary to petitioner's contentions, no
comparable statutory language or legislative intent is
present here.  Indeed, as discussed above, the Mine Act's
text and legislative history suggest precisely the oppo-
site.  The prospect that federal jurisdiction might thwart
effective enforcement of the statute also was less
immediate in Abbott Laboratories, since the Abbott
petitioners did not attempt to stay enforcement of the
challenged regulation pending judicial review, as peti-
tioner did here.  Id., at 155-156.

                      C
 We turn to the question whether petitioner's claims
are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within
this statutory structure.  This Court previously has
upheld district court jurisdiction over claims considered
-wholly `collateral'- to a statute's review provisions and
outside the agency's expertise, Heckler v. Ringer, 466
U. S. 602, 618 (1984), discussing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319 (1976), particularly where a finding of
preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review.
See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 544-545 (1988)
(statutory prohibition of all judicial review of Veterans
Administration benefits determinations did not preclude
jurisdiction over an otherwise unreviewable collateral
statutory claim); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 678-680 (1986); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 373-374 (1974); Oestereich v.
Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233, 237-238 (1968);
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 190 (1958) (upholding
injunction of agency action where petitioners had -no
other means within their control . . . to protect and
enforce that right-).  In Mathews v. Eldridge, for
example, it was held that 42 U. S. C. 405(g), which
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before
the denial of Social Security disability benefits may be
challenged in district court, was not intended to bar
federal jurisdiction over a due process challenge that
was -entirely collateral- to the denial of benefits, 424
U. S., at 330, and where the petitioner had made a
colorable showing that full postdeprivation relief could
not be obtained, id., at 331.
 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479
(1991), similarly held that an alien could bring a due
process challenge to Immigration and Naturalization
Service amnesty determination procedures, despite an
Immigration and Nationality Act provision expressly
limiting judicial review of individual amnesty determina-
tions to deportation or exclusion proceedings.  See 8
U. S. C. 1160(e).  This Court held that the statutory
language did not evidence an intent to preclude broad
-pattern and practice- challenges to the program, 498
U. S., at 494, 497, and acknowledged that -if not
allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court,
respondents would not as a practical matter be able to
obtain meaningful judicial review,- id., at 496.
 An analogous situation is not presented here.  Peti-
tioner pressed two primary claims below:  that the
UMWA designation under 813(f) violates the principles
of collective bargaining under the NLRA and petitioner's
right -to exclude nonemployee union organizers from [its]
property,- Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. ___, ___
(1992), and that adjudication of petitioner's claims
through the statutory-review provisions will violate due
process by depriving petitioner of meaningful review.
Petitioner's statutory claims at root require interpreta-
tion of the parties' rights and duties under 813(f) and
30 CFR pt. 40, and as such arise under the Mine Act
and fall squarely within the Commission's expertise.
The Commission, which was established as an indepen-
dent-review body to -develop a uniform and comprehen-
sive interpretation- of the Mine Act, Hearing on the
Nomination of Members of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission before the Senate Committee
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978), has
extensive experience interpreting the walk-around
rights and recently addressed the precise NLRA
claims presented here.  Although the Commission has
no particular expertise in construing statutes other than
the Mine Act, we conclude that exclusive review before
the Commission is appropriate since -agency expertise
[could] be brought to bear on- the statutory questions
presented here.  Whitney Bank, 379 U. S., at 420.
 As for petitioner's constitutional claim, we agree that
-[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies,- Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U. S., at 368, quoting Oestereich v. Selec-
tive Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result); accord, Califano v. Sanders, 430
U. S. 99, 109 (1977).  This rule is not mandatory,
however, and is perhaps of less consequence where, as
here, the reviewing body is not the agency itself but an
independent commission established exclusively to
adjudicate Mine Act disputes.  See Secretary v. Richard-
son, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 8, 18-20 (1981).  The Commission
has addressed constitutional questions in previous
enforcement proceedings.   Even if this were not the
case, however, petitioner's statutory and constitutional
claims here can be meaningfully addressed in the court
of appeals.
 We conclude that the Mine Act's comprehensive
enforcement structure, combined with the legislative
history's clear concern with channeling and streamlining
the enforcement process, establishes a -fairly discernible-
intent to preclude district court review in the present
case.  See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
U. S., at 351.  Petitioner's claims are -pre-enforcement-
only because the company sued before a citation was
issued, and its claims turn on a question of statutory
interpretation that can be meaningfully reviewed under
the Mine Act.  Had petitioner persisted in its refusal to
post the designation, the Secretary would have been
required to issue a citation and commence enforcement
proceedings.  See 30 U. S. C. 815(a) and 820 (1988 ed.
and Supp. IV).  Nothing in the language and structure
of the Act or its legislative history suggests that Con-
gress intended to allow mine operators to evade the
statutory-review process by enjoining the Secretary from
commencing enforcement proceedings, as petitioner
sought to do here.  To uphold the District Court's
jurisdiction in these circumstances would be inimical to
the structure and the purposes of the Mine Act.
                     IV
 Petitioner finally contends, in the alternative, that due
process requires district court review because the
absence of pre-enforcement declaratory relief before the
Commission will subject petitioner to serious and
irreparable harm.  We need not consider this claim,
however, because neither compliance with, nor continued
violation of, the statute will subject petitioner to a
serious prehearing deprivation.
 The record before us contains no evidence that
petitioner will be subject to serious harm if it complies
with 30 U. S. C. 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 by posting
the designations, and the potential for abuse of the
miners' representative position appears limited.  As the
District Manager of the MSHA stated to petitioner,
designation as a miners' representative does not convey
-an uncontrolled access right to the mine property to
engage in any activity that the miners' representative
wants.-  App. 49-50.  Statutory inspections of
petitioner's mine need occur only twice annually and are
conducted with representatives of the Secretary and the
operator.  Because the miners' representative cannot
receive advance notice of an inspection, the ability of the
nonemployee UMWA designees to exercise these limited
walk-around rights is speculative.  See Tr. of Oral Arg.
31; Brief for International Union, UMWA, as Amicus
Curiae 11, n. 2.  Although it is possible that a miners'
representative could abuse his privileges, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that such abuse, entirely hypothetical on the
record before us, cannot be remedied on an individual
basis under the Mine Act.  See 969 F. 2d, at 976-977,
and n. 6; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor,
897 F. 2d 447, 452 (CA10 1990); Kerr-McGee Coal Corp.
v. Secretary, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 352, 361-362 (1993).
 Nor will petitioner face any serious prehearing
deprivation if it refuses to post the designation while
challenging the Secretary's interpretation.  Although
the Act's civil penalties unquestionably may become
onerous if petitioner chooses not to comply, the
Secretary's penalty assessments become final and
payable only after full review by both the Commission
and the appropriate Court of Appeals.  30 U. S. C.
820(i) and 816.  A mine operator may request that
the Commission expedite its proceedings, 815(d), and
temporary relief of certain orders is available from the
Commission and the Court of Appeals.  815(b)(2) and
816(a)(2).  Thus, this case does not present the situation
confronted in Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148 (1908),
in which the practical effect of coercive penalties for
non-compliance was to foreclose all access to the courts.
Nor does this approach a situation in which compliance
is sufficiently onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently
potent that a constitutionally intolerable choice might be
presented.
                      V
 We conclude that the Mine Act's administrative struc-
ture was intended to preclude district court jurisdiction
over petitioner's claims and that those claims can be
meaningfully reviewed through that structure consistent
with due process.  The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

                           It is so ordered.